via Brad Younger (go check out his youtube channel)
“Shaun Gallagher argues that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The connections between this concept and recent embodied approaches to social cognition are explored.”
http://www.ummoss.org/
Whatever quibbles I might have with SG’s take on these matters a fleshing out of neopragmatism with an enactivist neurophenomenology (extended-mind-ing) is the way to go by my measure of things. Once you come to understand language uses as belonging to a family (think rhizome not tree) of the many human-animal actions than you can begin to map out a truly radical behaviorism. http://www.academia.edu/245547/Enactivism_Why_be_Radical