Phenomenology, as the movement inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859– 1938), is now a century old. Although the great precursor is Franz Brentano it would be Husserl in the Introduction to the Second Volume of the First Edition of his Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900– 1901), when, in discussing the need for a wide-ranging theory of knowledge, he speaks of “the phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing”.1 So phenomenology was first and foremost in the tradition of those German Idealists concerned with epistemology or a theory of knowledge and how we know, consciousness and the structure of consciousness. As Husserl states it:

This phenomenology, like the more inclusive pure phenomenology of experiences in general, has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or animal experients in the phenomenal…