One response to “The Rhythm of Thought: Movement in Merleau Ponty”

1. from Derrida’s discussion of Levinas’ thought of the other in relation to Husserl’s phenomenology of the other. Derrida says:
   “Every reduction of the other to a real moment of my life, its reduction to the state of an empirical alter-ego, is a possibility, or rather an empirical eventuality, which is called violence; and violence [that is, empirical or real violence]
   presupposes … necessary eidetic [or ideal] relationships
   . [However,] there is a transcendental …violence, an (in general dissymmetry) whose arche is the same…. This transcendental violence institutes the relationship between two finite ipseities. In effect, the necessity of gaining access to the meaning of the other (in its irreducible alterity)…on the basis of an intentional modification of my ego (in general)…; and the necessity of speaking of the other as other, or to the other as other, on the basis of its appearing-for me-as-what-it-is, that is, as other…
   — this necessity [of appearing or being a phenomenon] from which no discourse can escape, from its earliest origin — this necessity is violence itself, or rather the transcendental origin of an irreducible violence…”